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BOARD DIVERSITY REVISITED: NEW
RATIONALE, SAME OLD STORY?*
LISA M. FAIRFAX**
Recently, board diversity advocates have relied on market- or
economic-based rationales to convince corporate America to increase
the number of women and people of color in the boardroom, in lieu of
moral or social justifications. This shift away from moral or social
justifications has been deliberate, and it stems from a belief that
corporate America would better respond to justifications that centered
on the corporate bottom line. However, recent empirical data reveals
that despite the increased reliance on, and apparent acceptance of,
market- or economic-based rationales for board diversity, there has
been little change in actual board diversity. This Article argues that the
relative stagnation in board diversity can best be attributed to diversity
advocates’ overemphasis on the importance of business rationales for
diversity, coupled with their failure to acknowledge or otherwise bolster
the importance of social and moral justifications for board diversity
efforts. As a result, this Article not only concludes that business
justifications may be insufficient, at least standing alone, to advance
board diversity, but also insists that diversity advocates must pay
greater attention to the role of social and moral justifications in the
effort to diversify the corporate boardroom.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been considerable scholarly and
regulatory focus on board diversity,1 defined in this Article as the
portion of women and people of color on a corporate board.2 This
focus is perhaps best exemplified by a new U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rule requiring public companies to
provide disclosure of the extent to which their boards consider
diversity in the director nomination process.3 This disclosure
requirement appears to highlight the importance investors place on
board diversity.4
Historically, advocates of board diversity—like advocates of
diversity in other sectors—relied on moral or social justifications to
convince people of the desirability of such diversity.5 Such
1. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 3–6 (2007); Lissa
Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone
Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 432 (2008). With regard to regulation, Norway passed a
law requiring public companies to appoint women to hold some forty percent of board
seats. Stephanie Holmes, Smashing the Glass Ceiling, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2008),
www.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7176879.stm. Moreover, in 2009, the SEC passed
a rule requiring disclosures related to board diversity. See SEC Corporate Governance, 17
C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010).
2. Although there are many different forms of diversity, including race, gender,
national origin, sexual orientation, and viewpoint, consistent with my earlier articles, this
Article focuses on gender, racial, and ethnic diversity. This Article uses the term “people
of color” to refer to African Americans, Hispanic Americans/Latinos, Asian Americans,
and Native Americans as a group.
3. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi); see also Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334,
68,343–44 (Dec. 23, 2009) (discussing the reasons why the SEC found it important to adopt
these measures).
4. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,355.
5. See David B. Wilkins, “From Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is
Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the
Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1553 (2004); see, e.g., J. Cunyon Gordon,
Painting by Numbers: “And, Um, Let’s Have a Black Lawyer Sit at Our Table,” 71
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justifications were premised on the notion that increasing diversity
was the “right thing to do,” particularly because efforts to increase
diversity were aimed at rectifying existing inequalities stemming from
the lingering effects of slavery, segregation, and other forms of
discrimination.6
More recently, however, board diversity advocates have
gravitated toward market- or economic-based rationales for
advancing board diversity.7 These rationales, referred to herein as the
“business case,” rely on the proposition that increased board diversity
will improve the corporation’s bottom line.8
This rhetorical shift toward the business case and away from
moral or social rationales for diversity was deliberate, and it stemmed
from a belief that corporate America would not—and in some cases
could not—adequately pursue board diversity without sufficient
business justifications for that pursuit.9 The belief that efforts to
advance board diversity must focus on business rationales was based
on at least three presumptions. First, many diversity advocates began
to believe that historical rationales based on noneconomic, social or
moral grounds had proven ineffective in compelling corporate
America to diversify its boardroom.10 As a result, advocates believed
they needed to develop and advance economic-based rationales that
better appealed to members of the business community.11 Second, a
number of legal decisions, beginning with the Supreme Court’s

FORDHAM L. REV. 1257, 1277 (2003) (describing one university president’s attitude that
diversity policies are just “the right thing to do”); Vance Knapp & Bonnie Kae Grover,
The Corporate Law Firm—Can It Achieve Diversity?, 13 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 298, 303
(1994) (“Law firms should hire more minority attorneys, of course, for reasons of simple
justice.”); Taylor’s Perspective . . . : Law Firms Should Lash Back at the Diversity Backlash
“Movement,” OF COUNSEL (Aspen Publishers, Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 2007, at 3, 4
(“[S]ome law firms have sought to hire minority and women attorneys for the right
reason—it’s the morally proper thing to do . . . .”).
6. Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1553.
7. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis
of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795, 839–
40; Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1548–55.
8. See Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85,
85–86 (2000) (noting the importance of diversity to corporate America and its boards);
Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1553; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)
(relying in part on business leaders’ assertions of the importance of diversity to corporate
America to uphold law school affirmative action policy).
9. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 839–40; Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1548–55.
10. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 839–40; Wilkins supra note 5, at 1568–71 (discussing
how frustration with the slow pace of change has led to an embrace of rhetoric focusing on
the business case).
11. See Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1570–71.
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decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,12 not only
evidenced a growing dissatisfaction with moral and social
justifications for diversity, but also signaled a burgeoning
receptiveness to more market-oriented arguments for diversity.13
Third, it is entirely possible that corporate officers and directors did
not feel comfortable pursuing board diversity unless such pursuit
could be justified in terms of financial or economic rationales that
seemed more consistent with their fiduciary duty to maximize firm
value, and presumably to enhance shareholder returns.14 In this
regard, the shift toward justifying board diversity through reliance on
business rationales—and away from a focus on moral and social
rationales—reflected a practical and strategic assessment that the
business community would be more receptive and responsive to
economically-oriented justifications for diversifying corporate
boards.15
At first glance, it seems as if this rhetorical shift has achieved its
goal. Importantly, several studies appear to establish a link between
board diversity and improved financial performance, thereby
providing important empirical support for board diversity’s business
case.16 These studies help validate the business case and this
validation appears to have increased rhetorical support for board
diversity. In other words, corporations and critical members of the
investment community, including the SEC, appear more willing to
acknowledge the importance of board diversity, and that willingness
appears to be correlated with an acknowledgement of the merits of
the business case.17 Indeed, the SEC’s acknowledgement of those
merits appears to have played a role in its adoption of disclosure rules
in this area, suggesting that the business case has paved the way for
important legislative changes.18
However, a closer inspection of the current empirical data
reveals that, despite the increased reliance and focus on business
rationales for board diversity, there has been little change in actual
board diversity.19 Instead, the percentage of women and people of
12. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
13. See id. at 307–08 (plurality opinion); Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1554–55, 1558.
14. Fairfax, supra note 7, at 841.
15. See Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1568–71.
16. See infra Part I.A (discussing empirical evidence related to board diversity).
17. See infra Part I.B (discussing rhetorical support for the business case).
18. See infra Part I.C (discussing the adoption of the disclosure rule, and the SEC’s
acknowledgement of the merits of the business case).
19. See infra Part II (discussing empirical data on the amount of diversity in corporate
boardrooms).
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color on boards has been relatively stagnant, particularly over the last
five years.20
This Article argues that this relative stagnation has implications
for the merits of the business case as a tool in advancing board
diversity. In fact, this Article argues that such stagnation can best be
attributed to diversity advocates’ overemphasis on the extent to
which the business case can impact board diversity efforts, along with
their simultaneous underemphasis on the important role that social
and moral justifications must continue to play in such efforts. In this
regard, this Article concludes that the business case, standing alone, is
insufficient to ensure enhanced diversity in the boardroom.
This Article reaches this conclusion by critically examining why
the increased embrace of the business case has not translated into
increased board diversity. On the one hand, there may exist other
factors that not only explain the empirical evidence related to board
diversity, but also suggest that any conclusion about the merits of the
business case may be premature or unreliable.21 If these explanations
have merit, then they may undermine any conclusion that reliance on
the business case has proven unsuccessful. However, this Article
contends that while other factors may have played a role in the
relative stagnation in board diversity, they do not fully explain it.
Rather, the most likely reason for the stagnation appears to be the
relative ineffectiveness of the business case, at least standing alone, in
motivating corporations to diversify their boards. This conclusion has
important implications for board diversity efforts, suggesting that
diversity advocates need to alter their strategy in this area.
Part I of this Article demonstrates the apparent success of the
strategic shift toward relying on business rationales to support the
board diversity effort. This Part not only reveals an increase in
empirical evidence supporting the business case for diversity, but also
shows a growing rhetorical acceptance and acknowledgement of the
legitimacy of the business case among corporations and members of
the business community. Part I concludes by outlining the new SEC
rule on board diversity, which appears to have been premised on the
validity of the business case for board diversity. In sharp contrast to
20. See infra Part II.
21. For example, one may argue that the economic crisis may have created special
challenges for all diversity efforts. Then too, it is also arguable that it may be too soon to
ascertain the impact of the SEC’s new disclosure rule related to board diversity. To the
extent that the rule stemmed from an acknowledgement of the merits of the business case,
it also may be arguable that it is too soon to ascertain the impact of that case. Part III
addresses these and other factors more fully.
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the supposition that embracing the business case would increase
board diversity, Part II highlights empirical evidence revealing that
such an embrace apparently has had no impact on changing the status
quo in terms of board diversity. Part III explores reasons for that lack
of impact, concluding that while the business case for board diversity
may prove rhetorically appealing, it is insufficient on its own to
ensure a full commitment to board diversity.
I. THE BUSINESS CASE MAKES ITS CASE
The business case for board diversity encompasses a variety of
different strands.22 The unifying theme of those strands, however, is
that board diversity positively impacts corporate performance and the
corporation’s bottom line.23 The effort to develop and advance this
theme appears to have garnered positive results in at least three
respects. First, currently there is some empirical evidence
demonstrating a positive link between board diversity and firm
performance or positive corporate governance effects, thus seeming
to support the business case for diversity.24 Second, there seems to be
an increased (albeit rhetorical) acceptance of the importance of board
diversity to the corporate bottom line from both business
organizations and influential business leaders.25 Third, the SEC
recently adopted a rule requiring disclosure related to board
diversity.26 Such adoption was based, at least in part, on investors’
growing recognition of a connection between board diversity and
corporate performance.27 In their own way, therefore, each of these
developments reflects increased acceptance of the business case for
board diversity and hence positive developments for those who stress
the importance of that case for board diversity efforts.
A. The Empirical Case
Perhaps the most devastating criticism of the business case for
board diversity is that there is no empirical evidence or data to
support the case. Indeed, unlike moral and social rationales, business

22. See David A. Carter et al., The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and
Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE 396, 398
(2010); Fairfax, supra note 7, at 810.
23. Carter et al., supra note 22, at 398; Fairfax, supra note 7, at 810.
24. See infra Part I.A.
25. See infra Part I.B.
26. SEC Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010); Proxy
Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343–44, 68,364 (Dec. 23, 2009).
27. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,355.
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rationales are susceptible to proof, and thus seem to require that
diversity advocates establish the validity of the claims underlying such
rationales.28 Diversity advocates have expended considerable
resources attempting to establish some empirical support for the
business case.29 Those efforts have translated into some tentative
success.
Thus, there has been a growing body of studies establishing a
positive relationship between board diversity and improved financial
performance, measured in terms of various financial metrics including
returns on equity, returns on sales, and returns on invested capital.30
In one study, Catalyst found that companies with higher percentages
of women directors financially outperformed those with lower
percentages by significant margins.31 Catalyst also found strongerthan-average performance at companies with at least three women
directors.32 Another study revealed that, over a five year period, the
stocks of companies with significant board diversity outperformed
both the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the NASDAQ 100,
28. See, e.g., Carter et al., supra note 22, at 397 (noting the importance of establishing
that diversity actually enhances shareholder value).
29. See Press Release, Catalyst, Alliance for Board Diversity: Fact Sheet (May 11,
2005),
http://www.catalyst.org/press-release/117/alliance-for-board-diversity-fact-sheet
(describing how the Alliance for Board Diversity has dedicated resources to generate
research that makes the business case for board diversity).
30. See, e.g., Niclas L. Erhardt et al., Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial
Performance, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE 102, 107 (2003) (revealing a positive relationship
between gender, racial, and ethnic board diversity and both return on investment and
return on assets); Kathleen A. Farrell & Phillip L. Hersch, Additions to Corporate Boards:
The Effect of Gender, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 85, 86 (2005) (noting a positive relationship
between return on assets and the likelihood of adding women directors); Lois Joy et al.,
The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women’s Representation on Boards,
CATALYST (2007), http://www.catalyst.org/file/139/bottom%20line%202.pdf (finding a
positive correlation between corporate performance and higher percentage of women
board directors); VIRTCOM CONSULTING, BOARD DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY:
REALIZING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE 4–5 (2009),
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/invest-corp/diversification-strategy
.pdf [hereinafter VIRTCOM WHITE PAPER]. A study of companies in Finland revealed
similar results, showing that companies with significant female board members had
stronger returns on assets than those with male majorities. See ANNU KOTIRANTA ET AL.,
FINNISH BUS. & POLICY FORUM EVA, FEMALE LEADERSHIP AND FIRM PROFITABILITY
4–5 (2007), available at http://www.eva.fi/wp-content/uploads/files/2133_Analyysi_no
_003_eng_FemaleLeadership.pdf; see also VIRTCOM WHITE PAPER, supra, at 12
(discussing the correlation between female leadership and improved profitability found in
the Kotiranta et al. study).
31. Joy et al., supra note 30.
32. Id. This finding not only supports the business case for board diversity, but also
supports the theory that such a case can best be supported when boards achieve a critical
mass of women and people of color. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 837 (discussing the
importance of critical mass for people of color on boards); Joy et al., supra note 30.
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though they did not outperform the Standard & Poor’s 500 (“S&P
500”).33 One study of U.S. firms found a positive relationship between
board gender diversity and Tobin’s q,34 while another study of U.S.
firms found a significant positive relationship between the
percentages of women and ethnic minorities on the board and return
on assets and equity.35 Moreover, Virtcom Consulting (“Virtcom”), a
firm commissioned by the California Public Emloyees’ Retirement
System (“CalPERS”), the nation’s largest public pension fund and a
leading corporate activist,36 found in several instances that financial
performance improved after a company implemented diversity
initiatives.37
Of course, even this empirical evidence can be attacked as
inadequate because at best it reveals correlation, not causation. In
fact, researchers in this area clearly acknowledge the difficulties with
establishing causation.38 For example, it is not clear if betterperforming companies (because of their increased resources, greater
public scrutiny, or more prestige) attract diverse board candidates, or
if diverse board candidates lead to better-performing companies.39
Along with these favorable studies are those that demonstrate
different results. At least one study suggests a negative correlation
between board diversity and firm value.40 Some suggest that there is
33. VIRTCOM WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 10. The stocks of companies with a
significant number of diverse directors gained 16.2% from July 2003 to July 2008,
compared to 21.7% for the S&P 500, 15.9% for the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and
2.8% for the NASDAQ. Id.
34. Tobin’s q refers to the ratio between the market value of a firm divided by the
replacement cost of its assets. See Carter et al., supra note 22, at 403.
35. See David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity and Firm
Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 51 (2003); Erhardt et al., supra note 30, at 107; see also Carter et
al., supra note 22, at 399–400 (discussing studies).
36. See CALPERS CORP. GOVERNANCE, http://www.calpers-governance.org (last
visited Feb. 22, 2011); Stephen Choi & Jill Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence
on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 315, 315 (2008).
37. See VIRTCOM WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 15–22 (discussing a series of case
studies in which Virtcom revealed that corporate focus on diversity initiatives had a
significant impact on the corporation’s bottom line). For example, IBM partnered its
marketing group with women and ethnic minority employees to focus on potential women
and ethnic minority customers, and raised sales from such employees from $10 million in
1998 to over $300 million in 2003. Id. at 17. Similarly, Johnson Controls formed a series of
joint ventures with minority-owned businesses that led to nearly $6 billion in new profits.
Id. at 18.
38. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 433.
39. See id. at 433–34.
40. See Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their
Impact on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 292–93 (2009) (finding that
female board members have a positive and significant impact on corporate governance,
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no link between board diversity and firm value.41 Importantly, one
study attempted to test for a causal link between board diversity and
improved financial performance by examining U.S. based firms in the
Fortune 500, and did not find “any empirical evidence of causation
going from board diversity to financial performance, either positive or
negative.”42 The existence of these studies suggests that the business
case for board diversity is both equivocal and more nuanced than
once thought.43 Such an assessment is consistent with the presumption
that the business case for diversity may only find empirical support
under particular circumstances,44 such as when boards have a critical
mass of diverse directors.45
Regardless of the mixed nature of the evidence, the empirical
record is likely a net positive for diversity advocates and the business
case. To be sure, there is considerably more work to be done in this
area. However, even the most recent study finding no causal
connection between board diversity and firm performance not only
found some positive relationship between board diversity and firm
performance, but also underscored the fact that the study found “no
evidence of a negative link between board diversity and financial
but they have a negative impact on firm performance measured in terms of Tobin’s q and
return on assets—though women directors may have a more positive impact on firm
performance in a firm with weak shareholder rights because women tend to be better
monitors).
41. See TROND RANDØY ET AL., A NORDIC PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE BOARD
DIVERSITY 21–24 (2006), available at http://www.nordicinnovation.net/_img/a_
nordic_perspective_on_board_diversity_final_web.pdf (finding that board diversity in
terms of gender, age, and nationality had no significant impact on stock market
performance or returns on assets within the 500 largest companies in Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden); Farrell & Hersch, supra note 30, at 86; Caspar Rose, Does Female Board
Representation Influence Firm Performance? The Danish Evidence, 15 CORP.
GOVERNANCE 404, 404 (2007).
42. Carter et al., supra note 22, at 411.
43. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 434–35.
44. See Carter et al., supra note 22, at 411 (noting that the body of research suggesting
no relationship between board composition and firm performance may be attributed to
the fact that “under some conditions board diversity has a positive effect on financial
performance and under other conditions board diversity has a negative effect, [so that]
over time and many firms, the results may cancel out leaving no measurable result”).
45. The literature related to critical mass suggests that people of color may not feel
comfortable expressing their views within a group if they are the only one or one of a few
diverse people in the group. See Emily Calhoun, An Essay on the Professional
Responsibility of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 1, 14–15 (2002); Fairfax, supra note 7, at 837; Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven Andrew
Light, Teaching Race Without a Critical Mass: Reflections on Affirmative Action and the
Diversity Rationale, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 316, 317–18 (2004); see also Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 318–19 (2003) (emphasizing the importance of critical mass to ensuring that
students of color express their views).
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performance,” and hence that their evidence did not refute the
business case.46 When taken together, there exists at least some—
albeit tentative—empirical support that board diversity may lead to
increased firm value or improved corporate governance under some
conditions.
B.

The Rhetorical Case

Increasingly, business leaders also appear to be embracing board
diversity based on business rationales. Key leaders in the business and
investment community, from Calvert Group Ltd. (“Calvert”) to
CalPERS, the National Association of Corporate Directors, and the
Conference Board,47 have embraced the business rationale for
diversity.48 For example, the Council of Institutional Investors (the
“Council”), an association of public, union, and corporate pension
funds, publishes a set of policies to serve as guidelines for what it
believes to be corporate best practices; these policies include support
for board diversity.49 However, in 2009 the Council amended its board
diversity statement to make clear that support for board diversity was
based on the Council’s belief that a diverse board “can enhance
corporate financial performance.”50 The amendment was designed to
reflect studies suggesting the positive connection between board
diversity and firm performance.51
The following comments from Calvert to the SEC further
illustrate the business community’s embrace of the business case:
Diversity is a critical attribute to a well functioning board and
an essential measure of good governance. In an increasingly

46. Carter et al., supra note 22, at 411.
47. The Conference Board is a business organization supported by business
executives that convenes conferences and conducts business management research, with a
membership representing over 1,400 companies including nearly half of the Fortune 500.
See Our Community, CONFERENCE BD., http://www.conference-board.org/about/index
.cfm?id=1975 (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
48. See, e.g., CAROLYN BRANCATO & JEANETTE PATTERSON, BOARD DIVERSITY IN
U.S. CORPORATIONS: BEST PRACTICES FOR BROADENING THE PROFILE OF
CORPORATE BOARDS 6–7 (1999) (noting that diversity is a key part of good governance);
VIRTCOM WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 6 (study commissioned by CalPERS).
49. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
POLICIES 4 (2010), available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CII%20Corp%20Gov
%20Policies%20Full%20and%20Current%204-13-10.pdf.
50. Press Release, Council of Institutional Investors, Council Adopts New Policies
and Endorses Principles for Reform of the U.S. System of Financial Market Regulation
(May 11, 2009), http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/press%20release%20on%20new%20
policies%2005-11-09.pdf.
51. See id.
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complex global marketplace, the ability to draw on a wide
range of viewpoints, backgrounds, skills, experience and
expertise internally increases the likelihood of making the right
decisions. Director and nominee diversity that includes race,
gender, culture, age, and geography helps to ensure that
different perspectives are brought to bear on issues, while
enhancing the likelihood that proposed solutions will be
nuanced and comprehensive.52
In addition to these business leaders, many companies and
directors express a desire for board diversity. For example, one
survey demonstrated that several major companies expressed a
commitment to considering diversity in the selection of board
members.53 Similarly, a recent study of S&P 500 boards found that
such boards rank diversity at the top of their wish list of what they
look for in board candidates, second only to financial expertise.54
Given the sentiment expressed by many in the corporate world that
diversity without a business case was an insufficient reason to act, this
ranking seems to be based on a belief in the business case.55 To be
sure, not all corporations, investors, and directors express a
commitment to board diversity or otherwise embrace the business
case for diversity. However, the increased reliance on economic and
market rationales to justify the importance of board diversity reflects
the growing rhetorical acceptance of the business case within the
corporate community.
C.

The SEC’s Case

In December 2009, the SEC approved a rule requiring disclosure
of whether and to what extent a corporation’s nominating committee
considers diversity when nominating candidates to the board of

52. Letter from William M. Tartikoff, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Calvert
Grp., Ltd., and Ivy Wafford Duke, Assistant Vice President & Deputy Gen. Counsel,
Calvert Grp., Ltd. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Sept. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.calvertgroup.com/NRC/literature/documents/sri-20100125-SEC-ProxyDisclosure.pdf.
53. See generally Corporate Board Diversity Disclosure Scorecard, CALVERT INVS.
(Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.calvert.com/nrc/external/sec-scorecard.pdf [hereinafter
Disclosure Scorecard] (pinpointing several companies with disclosure on diversity prior to
the SEC’s new requirement).
54. See SPENCER STUART, 2009 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 15 (2009), available
at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBI2009.pdf.
55. See Carter et al., supra note 35, at 35.
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directors.56 Under the rule, corporations must disclose “whether, and
if so how, the nominating committee . . . considers diversity in
identifying nominees for director.”57 If the nominating committee or
the board has “a policy with regard to the consideration of diversity in
identifying director nominees,” the final rules require disclosure “of
how this policy is implemented” and “how the nominating committee
(or the board) assesses the effectiveness of its policy.”58 This rule
became effective February 28, 2010.59
This new rule seems to reflect an implicit endorsement of the
legitimacy of the business rationale for board diversity.60 Specifically,
in explaining its reasons for adopting the new rule, the SEC
referenced, among other things, the fact that commentators noted the
appearance of a “meaningful relationship between diverse boards and
improved corporate financial performance.”61 In this regard, the
SEC’s willingness to adopt the new rule can be directly linked to the
apparently increased acceptance of the business case.
As this Part reveals, by emphasizing—and at least providing
tentative support for—the business case for board diversity, diversity
advocates have managed to encourage corporations and other
relevant agencies and entities to acknowledge, and at least
rhetorically support, the business case.
II. BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY: DIVERSITY BY THE
NUMBERS
Unfortunately, the apparent acknowledgment of the business
case has not translated into changes in board diversity. Because
corporations are not required to report on the diversity of their
directors, the statistics in this area are difficult to obtain and often
vary slightly. However, they all highlight the same troubling reality:
diversity has remained relatively unchanged over the past several
years.
The empirical data related to the presence of women and people
of color on corporate boards reflects this lack of change. From 2005
to 2007, the percentage of Fortune 1000 corporate boards with at least
56. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010). The new rule amends Item 407(c) of
Regulation S-K. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 (Dec. 23,
2009).
57. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi).
58. Id.
59. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,334.
60. See id. at 68,343.
61. Id.
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one woman only grew by 1%, from 84% to 85%.62 Similarly, in 2009,
89% of S&P 500 companies had at least one female director, up from
88% in 2004.63
A similar pattern emerges with respect to people of color. The
number of Fortune 1000 companies with at least one person of color
on the board grew 2%, from 76% to 78%.64 The lack of progress has
been the same for all ethnic groups, and in fact, such groups’
percentage representation on the board has remained virtually
unchanged since 2003.65 Similarly, 85% of the largest 200 S&P 500
boards have at least one person of color, reflecting no change since
2005.66 While these statistics reveal that most companies have at least
one person of color or woman on their board, they also suggest that
representation of such groups on the corporate board has “hit a
barrier.”67
Perhaps more troubling is the relative stagnation in the total
number of board seats that women and people of color held. With
respect to S&P 1500 board seats, women held 12% of such seats in
2008, “which [was] unchanged from 2005.”68 The story remains the
same with respect to Fortune 500 boards. In 2003, women held 13.6%

62. KORN/FERRY INST., 34TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 7 (n.d.),
available at http://www.kornferryinstitute.com/files/pdf1/Board_Study07_LoRez_FINAL
.pdf.
63. SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 17.
64. KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 62, at 7.
65. See id. at 18. In 2003 and 2007, 47% of Fortune 1000 boards had at least one
African American director, 19% had at least one Latino director, and the number of
boards with at least one Asian board member rose from 10% to 11%. Id.
66. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 18. To be sure, there has been some
change in the type of persons of color that hold board seats. See id. Hence, while the
number of corporations with at least one Latino director has remained basically
unchanged (from 39% in 2005 to 40% in 2009), there has been an increase in the number
of corporations with at least one Asian director (from 9% in 2005 to 14% in 2009) coupled
with a decrease in the percentage of corporations with at least one African American
director (from 84% in 2005 to 79% in 2009). Id.
67. KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 62, at 4, 6–7.
68. RISKMETRICS GRP., BOARD PRACTICES: TRENDS IN BOARD STRUCTURE AT
S&P 1,500 COMPANIES 1 (2008) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). A board
diversity study of the fifty largest corporations in North Carolina revealed that in 2010,
12.3% of the board seats were held by women, as compared to 11.2% in 2006, while 7.1%
of such seats were held by people of color, up from 6% since 2006. Corporate Board
Diversity Gains in State, But Lags Fortune 100, UNC Study Reports, UNC NEWS (May 24,
2010), http://uncnews.unc.edu/content/view/3661/70/.
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of Fortune 500 board seats;69 in 2008 that number had risen less than
2% to 15.2% of total Fortune 500 directorships.70
With respect to people of color, empirical evidence reveals that
they hold 10% of S&P 1500 board seats—“unchanged . . . since
2004.”71 In addition, in 2007 people of color held 11% of the board
seats in S&P 500, as compared to 10% of such seats in 2000.72 Thus,
there has been a mere 1% growth in seven years. For women of color,
the statistical increase is even smaller as compared to women and
people of color, generally. In 2003, women of color held 3% of
Fortune 500 seats, and by 2008, that number had risen by 0.2% to
3.2% of directorships.73
Importantly, the percentage of women and people of color has
remained unchanged even as corporations have added board seats.
From 2004 to 2006, although Fortune 100 companies added twentyfour new board seats, women and people of color collectively had a
net gain of three Fortune 100 board seats.74 This statistic suggests that
corporations have not filled new director seats with women and
people of color.75 Instead, the empirical evidence reveals that within
the last several years, the overall representation of women and people
of color on boards has remained relatively static.76 This stagnation

69. CATALYST, 2003 CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN BOARD DIRECTORS 1 (2003),
available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/76/2003%20catalyst%20census%20wbd.pdf.
70. See CATALYST, 2008 CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN BOARD DIRECTORS OF THE
FORTUNE 500, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/242/08_census_wbd
_jan.pdf.
71. RISKMETRICS GRP., supra note 68, at 1.
72. Phred Dvorak, Some Things Don’t Change, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14. 2008, at R4
(citing study by Investor Shareholder Services (now known as MSCI)). Indeed, one study
reveals that the percentage of African Americans on Fortune 500 companies’ boards has
declined, with such directors holding 8.1% of seats in 2004 and 7.4% of directorships in
2008. African Americans Lost Ground on Fortune 500 Boards: Blacks Remain Seriously
Underrepresented, EXEC. LEADERSHIP COUNCIL (July 17, 2009), http://www.elcinfo.com/
BoardCensus.php (describing study of Fortune 500 boards); see also Letter from Carl
Brooks, President & CEO, Exec. Leadership Council, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y,
SEC 1 (Sept. 15, 2009) (citing 2008 study of African Americans on Fortune 500 boards),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-142.pdf.
73. CATALYST, supra note 69, at 1; CATALYST, supra note 70, at 2.
74. THE ALLIANCE FOR BD. DIVERSITY, WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE
100 BOARDS 5 (2008), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/86/1-17-08%20abd%20
study.pdf.
75. Indeed, while boards rated finding diverse directors as one of their top priorities
in seeking to fill new board positions, the number of such directors actually nominated and
elected does not reflect this priority. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 15.
76. KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 62, at 6–7.
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runs counter to the expectation and hope that board reforms would
positively impact board diversity.77
More critically, this stagnation also runs counter to expectations
regarding the manner in which an increased acceptance of the
business case for board diversity would impact diversity efforts and
results. Indeed, diversity advocates had hoped that relying on the
business case would prompt corporations to increase their diversity
efforts. Instead, these numbers reveal that such reliance may have
had little impact on such efforts.
III. THE BUSINESS CASE AND ROADBLOCKS TO BOARD DIVERSITY
The relative stagnation in board diversity that the empirical data
highlights is likely due to the inadequacies of the business rationale
itself. In order to support this assertion, this Part considers, but
ultimately rejects, other explanations for the empirical evidence set
forth in Part II.
Indeed, it could be possible that factors other than the
ineffectiveness of the business case better explain the empirical
evidence in the previous section. This Article examines three
alternative explanations for the relative stagnation in board diversity.
First, one may argue that the economic crisis stymied corporate
diversity efforts, not only making any current data in this area
unreliable, but also making it difficult to conclusively assess the
impact of the business case. Second, it may be too soon to assess how
the SEC’s new disclosure rule will impact diversity efforts; further, to
the extent the rule was prompted by an enhanced embrace of the
business case, it also may be too soon to assess the impact of the
business case. Third, it is possible that the relative stagnation reflects
the fact that the corporate community is still unconvinced by the
empirical evidence related to board diversity. From this perspective,
perhaps additional or more rigorous empirical data in this area will
eventually turn the tide in favor of increased board diversity. To the
extent any of these rationales are compelling, they undermine the
contention that the business case has proven unsuccessful. However,
an analysis of these rationales reveals that they fall short of fully
explaining the empirical data. As a result, the relative stagnation in
board diversity strongly suggests that the strategy of building and
proving the business case has failed to sufficiently motivate
corporations.

77. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 803–11.
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This Article seeks to assess the reason for that failure. Indeed,
perhaps diversity advocates placed too much emphasis on trying to
determine the most appropriate justifications for board diversity.
Instead, other factors may have a more significant impact on
determining whether corporations can and will implement policies
that foster diversity. Such factors include adequate responses to the
pool problem,78 the need for a significant shift in board culture, and a
better recognition and understanding of the impact of ingrained
biases on diversity efforts. These other factors play a critical role in
issues affecting board diversity, and coupled with the business case’s
rhetorical appeal, may suggest that ensuring corporate support of the
business case was a necessary, but not sufficient, strategy for
eventually achieving significant board diversity.
Part III first considers other explanations for the disappointing
empirical data in this area and then discusses the drawbacks inherent
in a diversity strategy that relies primarily, if not completely, on the
business case.
A. The Economics of Diversity
In 2008, the worst financial and economic crisis since the Great
Depression hit the United States and other global markets.79 That
crisis may have created special challenges for diversity efforts. If these
challenges sufficiently account for the stalled diversity numbers, then,
at the very least, the crisis may undermine our ability to assess the
relative merits of the business case.
First, the mere existence of the economic and financial crisis may
make it difficult for corporations to focus on anything beyond
survival. As a result of the economic environment, corporations have
had to make difficult choices regarding how best to allocate scarce
resources in order to survive and begin the process of returning to
prosperity. Board diversity may be one casualty of these choices and
budgetary constraints.80 Then, too, identifying and recruiting new,
78. See infra Part III.D.2 (describing the pool problem as the notion that the pool of
candidates for a diverse board may be relatively small based on the customary preference
for active or retired executives and CEOs).
79. See Anthony Faiola, The End of American Capitalism?, WASH. POST, Oct. 10,
2008, at A1; Press Release, Bus. Wire, Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial
Crisis Since Great Depression; Risks Increase if Right Steps Are Not Taken (Feb. 27,
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS193520+27-Feb-2009+BW 20090
227.
80. See Heather Arnet & M.J. Tocci, Why Diversity Matters, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Mar. 17, 2009, at E22; William Schackelford, Doing Diversity in Tough
Economic Times, WORKFORCE DIVERSITY NETWORK, 1, http://www.workforcediversity
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diverse candidates likely requires additional outreach efforts and the
expenditure of additional resources, which the current crisis may
make more difficult. From this perspective, the mere existence of an
economic crisis poses challenges for diversity efforts.
In addition, the financial crisis appears to have encouraged
corporations to focus their board recruitment efforts on criteria that
may have a negative impact on board diversity. Evidence reveals that
the financial crisis has prompted corporations to actively seek out
more “experienced” board members.81 As an initial matter, this has
translated into a focus on directors who previously have served on
boards. Thus, in 2009, only sixteen percent of new S&P directors were
first timers, by far the smallest percentage in recent years.82 In the
past five years, the total number of new appointees to S&P 500
boards dropped by twenty-five percent.83 Given the relatively small
numbers of women and people of color currently serving on boards,84
the decrease in the number of first-time board members may well
explain the relative stagnation in diverse directors.
In addition to the focus on prior board service, the economic
crisis also has prompted corporations to increase their preference for
directors who are retired CEOs or other corporate executives, placing
directors with such experience at the top of their wish list for new
directors.85 As a result, the demand for such directors far outstrips the
supply.86 Indeed, “[a]lmost a third of new female . . . directors are
current or former [executives].”87 In light of the small percentage of
women and people of color in executive suites,88 the focus on
executive level experience further undermines any attempts to
diversify boards. While it is unclear what kind of impact the increased
emphasis on prior service and executive experience will have on a
corporation’s financial performance, it is clear that it does not bode
network.com/docs/Articles/Article_DoingDiversityToughTimes_11.08.pdf (last visited
Feb. 22, 2011). But see Heather Joslyn, Belts Tightened by Recession, Diversity Officers
Stretch Resources, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Sept. 17, 2009, at D5 (noting that while the
pressure of the economic downturn has made it difficult for some organizations to focus
on hiring, other organizations have continued to make strides in hiring diversity officers).
81. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 13.
82. Id. at 12.
83. Id.
84. See supra Part II.
85. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 12–13.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 14.
88. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards:
Women, People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1112 (2005).
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well for board diversity. In this regard, the economic crisis appears to
have narrowed the criteria corporations use to identify board
candidates, thereby limiting the ability of corporations to engage in
significant diversity efforts.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the economic crisis may
have skewed the results of diversity efforts by shrinking the pool of
diverse candidates and making it more difficult to dedicate resources
toward expanding that pool. It could be that once the crisis passes,
corporations will be better positioned and equipped to enhance
diversity in a meaningful manner. As a result, it is arguable that such
a crisis hampers any attempt to draw conclusions about the
effectiveness of the business case or overall diversity efforts.
However, such an argument rings hollow simply because the
apparent stagnation in diversity appears to have predated the
economic crisis. Indeed, diversity efforts in this area appeared to have
stalled as early as 2005, at least a couple of years before 2007 and
2008, when the current crisis fully emerged.89 From this perspective,
while the economic crisis may have exacerbated diversity efforts, the
crisis cannot shoulder the full blame for why diversity efforts appear
to have stalled out.
B.

The Novelty of the SEC’s Disclosure Rule

One may also argue that the relative newness of the SEC’s
disclosure rule on diversity may make it difficult to truly assess the
impact of the business case. In other words, it may be too soon to tell
how the SEC’s new disclosure rule will impact diversity efforts. As a
result, it also may be premature to speculate as to how the business
rationale has impacted board diversity.
On the one hand, the mere fact that the SEC has adopted such a
rule may be viewed as a success for the business case because the
rationale appeared to influence the SEC’s decision in this area. Not
only did many SEC comment letters focus on such a rationale, but the
SEC highlighted the rationale in its adoptive release.90 In particular,
the SEC noted that the new rule could enhance board quality and
decision making, two key components of the business rationale.91

89. See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
90. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 (Dec. 23, 2009)
(“Commenters also noted that there appears to be a meaningful relationship between
diverse boards and improved corporate financial performance, and that diverse boards can
help companies more effectively recruit talent and retain staff.”).
91. Id. at 68,355.
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Hence, regardless of the rule’s impact, the mere adoption of the rule
suggests the benefits of embracing the business case.
Additionally, the rule could significantly increase the number of
corporations that adopt diversity policies. To be sure, the SEC
insisted that the rule was “not intended to steer behavior.”92
However, the SEC also recognized that because of the rule, boards
could find it “beneficial” to disclose and follow a board diversity
policy.93 In other words, because corporations may wish to avoid
admitting that they do not have a board diversity policy, the rule may
encourage corporations to adopt such a policy. The SEC also
recognized that the rule could encourage boards to conduct broader
director searches that focus on candidates with a wider range of
qualities and characteristics.94 In these ways, the SEC acknowledged
that the rule could prompt more corporations to embrace diversity
procedures.
There is at least some tentative evidence indicating that the rule
could have a positive impact on the corporate adoption of diversity
statements. As a result of the rule, several law firms already have
recommended that corporations without such policies consider
adopting them.95 This kind of recommendation suggests that the rule
could spur a more widespread adoption of board diversity policies.
Indeed, a limited study indicated that, as a result of the SEC rule,
some corporations have altered their diversity statements to be more
inclusive, while others that previously had no policy either have
stated an intention to consider diversity when recruiting directors or
have expressed a belief in the importance of diversity.96
Moreover, the rule could facilitate the adoption of more effective
policies. To be sure, there is no guarantee that an increased adoption
of board diversity policies will translate into an increased amount of
actual board diversity. However, the SEC’s rule increases the
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Mark Poerio et al., SEC Rule Changes for 2010: Be Ready to Be Held
Accountable, STAY CURRENT (PaulHastings, L.A., Cal.), Jan. 2010, at 1, 8, available at
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1479.pdf; SEC Adopts Proxy Rules
Changes for 2010 Proxy Season, LEGAL NEWS ALERT (Foley & Lardner LLP, Chi., Ill.),
Dec. 2009, at 1, 4, available at http://www.foley.com/abc.aspx?Publication=6687; Robert A.
Friedel, Amended SEC Disclosure Requirements: Practice Pointers to Facilitate
Compliance in 2010, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.pepperlaw.com/
publications_update.aspx?ArticleKey=1667.
96. See Disclosure Scorecard, supra note 53 (noting, for example that Alcoa
significantly bolstered its disclosure language after the SEC adoption of the new rule in
2010 and that Citigroup included diversity language where it provided none before).
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likelihood of such a translation in at least two ways. First, the rule
does not merely require disclosure on the existence of a diversity
policy, but also requires disclosure about how the policy is being
implemented, and how a corporation assesses the policy’s
effectiveness.97 Such disclosure seems to require corporations to
defend their diversity policy. The need to defend the policy should
incentivize corporations to adopt policies that yield results.
Importantly, in its study of board diversity, Virtcom found that the
existence of an outlined strategy for implementing a diversity
initiative may be an important factor in promoting a company’s
overall profitability.98 Hence, requiring corporations to address the
effectiveness of their diversity policy could increase the potential that
such a policy will lead to greater diversity. In other words, such a
requirement could increase public scrutiny of existing policies,
thereby encouraging corporations to ensure that those policies
produce results. Second, enhanced disclosure of policies that yield
results not only could give companies without policies the confidence
needed to adopt their own, but also could enhance overall diversity
policies by providing a public platform for corporations to trade best
practices in this area.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the SEC’s adoption of a
diversity disclosure rule may validate the importance of the business
case for diversity. First, the very fact that the business case may have
prompted the adoption of such a rule could be viewed as a critical
example of the benefits of embracing the business case. Second, the
rule not only may encourage more corporations to adopt diversity
policies, but also may encourage corporations to ensure that those
policies prove effective. Hence, it is possible that the rule could
facilitate future changes in board diversity.
Moreover, because it is possible that the SEC’s rule could
facilitate future changes in board diversity, the current empirical data
related to the progress of board diversity may be unreliable. From
this perspective, it may be inappropriate to evaluate the impact of the
business case until the SEC’s rule has had an opportunity to take
effect.
However, the nature of the SEC rule may undermine its ability
to positively impact board diversity. As an initial matter, and perhaps
most devastating to the rule’s potential effectiveness, is the SEC’s
refusal to define diversity. Instead, the SEC left it for companies to
97. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010).
98. VIRTCOM WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 16.
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define diversity “in ways that they consider appropriate.”99 While a
corporation’s definition may include “concepts such as race, gender
and national origin,” it also may include “differences of viewpoint,
professional experience, education, skill and other individual qualities
and attributes.”100 While these other characteristics may be relevant
to good corporate governance, inclusion of them in the definition of
diversity may significantly undermine the extent to which the new
rule increases the number of women and people of color on the
board. Instead, based on these criteria, many boards already may be
able to define themselves as diverse, and thus may have no incentive
to diversify their boards.101 The failure to define diversity could limit
significantly the ability of the SEC’s new rule to alter the status quo
with respect to racial and gender diversity on boards.
Another important limitation on the rule’s impact may be that it
does not require corporations to have an actual policy related to
diversity.102 To be sure, it may be inappropriate for the SEC to
require corporations to consider diversity in their board structure.
However, the lack of such a requirement undermines the rule’s ability
to influence adoption of diversity policies. Indeed, a Calvert study
indicates that, in direct response to the SEC rule, one company
(which previously had made no disclosure with respect to diversity)
stated that it does not consider diversity in evaluating potential
directors because the company does not believe that diversity “is
relevant to a person’s qualifications to serve on the Board,” nor does
the company believe that the diversity of a person’s background
“significantly affect[s] a person’s ability to contribute to [the]
Board.”103 Such disclosure not only reveals that some corporations do
not consider diversity in their board recruitment, but also eloquently
underscores the fact that the SEC rule may fail to encourage such
consideration.

99. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,344.
100. Id.
101. To be sure, over the last few years, boards have increasingly focused on recruiting
the same type of candidate—namely retired or active executives. SPENCER STUART, supra
note 54, at 13. While these candidates may be diverse in their industry backgrounds, it is
not clear that the candidates add to racial and gender diversity on boards. See id.
102. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010) (“If the nominating committee . . . has a
policy with regard to the consideration of diversity in identifying director nominees,
describe how this policy is implemented . . . .”) (emphasis added).
103. Disclosure Scorecard, supra note 53 (describing disclosure from Lennar
Corporation, which had previously made no disclosure with respect to its company’s
consideration of diversity).

FAIRFAX.PTD2

876

3/30/2011 10:03 AM

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

It also is possible that the new rule could discourage corporate
adoption of diversity policies. Corporations may shy away from
adopting a policy based on the fear that the corporation would be
unable to adequately defend its effectiveness. In fact, at least one
commentator has recommended that boards not institute a diversity
policy for precisely this reason.104 With respect to this issue, the
Calvert study demonstrates that while most corporations have
responded to the new SEC rule by enhancing their disclosure on
diversity and indicating their intention to consider diversity in
connection with consideration of potential director candidates,
several corporations made clear that they do not have a formal policy
on board diversity.105 A corporation’s decision not to adopt such a
formal policy may be designed to avoid the added burden of having to
defend it. Hence, the rule may have the unintended consequence of
limiting boards’ willingness to formalize their diversity efforts.
As this discussion reveals, it is possible that the relative novelty
of the SEC’s new rule makes it difficult to determine the impact of
the business case on board diversity, particularly because the rule
creates the possibility that board diversity will improve in the future.
However, the SEC’s new rule has shortcomings that may hinder its
overall effectiveness. These shortcomings raise considerable doubt
that such a rule can enhance board diversity or otherwise serve as a
successful example of the benefits associated with embracing the
business case.
C.

The Fragility of the Empirical Case

It is possible that the relative stagnation in board diversity
reflects the fact that the corporate community is still unconvinced by
the empirical evidence related to board diversity. As Part I reveals,
the empirical evidence regarding the link between board diversity and
104. TK Kerstetter, And Your Definition of Board Diversity Is . . . , BOARD BLOG
(Jan. 18, 2010, 7:51:50 AM), http://www.boardmember.com/The-Board-Blog-And-yourdefinition-of-board-diversity-is.aspx?blogid=473. Kerstetter notes, “I wonder, after
reading the disclosure language, if it wouldn’t be better for boards to have a formal policy
on diversity going into this exercise. I say that because if you do, you will need to describe
how the nominating and governance committee implements and assesses the effectiveness
of that policy. It seems to me, if you aren’t very effective that it would just be better to
have a statement on how the nominating committee looks at diversity in board
composition and save being scrutinized on its effectiveness. The point here is that you will
have to define it, and if a formal policy exists, you will have to defend it.” Id.
105. Those companies include Advanced Micro Devices Inc., AES Corp., AT&T Inc.,
Bucyrus International Inc., HCP Inc., Humana Inc., MEMC Electronic Materials Inc.,
Office Depot Inc., PPG Industries, T Rowe Price Group Inc., and TCF Financial Corp. See
Disclosure Scorecard, supra note 53.
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financial performance is mixed, with some studies suggesting no
correlation or a negative correlation between the two.106 Moreover,
several studies demonstrating more positive results have been
criticized for their empirical shortcomings.107 Not only may the mixed
empirical data suggest a need for more studies or more rigorous
studies, but they also may explain why more corporations have not
diversified their board—they are simply waiting for better empirical
support. From this perspective, one may argue that additional or
more rigorous empirical data in this area will eventually turn the tide
in favor of increased board diversity.108
Unfortunately, the mixed state of the data may be an inevitable
by-product of efforts to measure board diversity. Indeed, it is not
clear whether and to what extent further empirical studies will
translate into more definitive support for the business case for at least
two reasons. First, as researchers indicate, it is difficult to generate
empirical evidence in this area because of the difficulties with
collecting data and accurately pinpointing causation.109 In this regard,
while we may have some improvement in this area, shoring up the
empirical weaknesses may prove intractable. Second, the evidence in
this area may be mixed precisely because the business case is nuanced
and depends upon variables that may or may not exist within
particular corporations.110 Such an observation suggests that the
empirical flaws may be difficult, if not impossible, to definitively
resolve. Thus, as one study notes, the empirical connection between
board diversity and firm performance “may be too nuanced to
statistically tease out.”111 Hence, if corporations are waiting for more
empirically sound results before making more significant strides with
respect to board diversity, then their wait may be in vain.

106. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
107. See Adams & Ferreira, supra note 40, at 292–93; see also Broome & Krawiec,
supra note 1, at 433–34 (commenting generally on the difficulties of assessing the
relationship between diversity and performance); Carter et al., supra note 22, at 400
(comparing the available empirical data and noting that statistical methods, data, and time
periods investigated vary greatly so that the results are not easily comparable).
108. See Adams & Ferreira, supra note 40, at 292 (noting the difficulties with
interpreting the causal connection between board diversity and firm performance);
Broome & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 433–34 (suggesting more empirical and theoretical
work is required to better understand the impact of board diversity on performance);
Rose, supra note 41, at 412 (suggesting more research and case studies are needed to
better understand the impact of women on boards).
109. See, e.g., Broome & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 433–34.
110. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 810–38.
111. Carter et al., supra note 22, at 411.
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Of course, the notion that the inability of the business case to
impact board diversity is solely a function of the mixed or flawed
empirical data is not entirely convincing. On the one hand, to the
extent that corporations believe that some empirical foundation is
necessary before implementing board diversity, one would expect the
existence of positive studies in this area to have had at least some
impact on those corporations’ diversity efforts. Indeed, there are at
least some studies that have found positive links between board
diversity and corporate performance.112 One would expect that, to the
extent that data was the concern, such data would prove sufficient to
convince at least some corporations to enhance their diversity efforts,
and hence to trigger some changes in the diversity numbers. The fact
that such data exists, and that stagnation continues in the area of
board diversity, suggests that the problem is broader than one related
to lack of empirical proof or rigor.
Importantly, despite relatively mixed or flawed data with respect
to other reforms, some corporations have been willing to embrace
such reforms. For example, many experts agree that the empirical
evidence related to the benefits of director independence is
dubious.113 Despite this mixed evidence, boards enthusiastically
embraced such independence even before reforms mandated it.114
This acceptance demonstrates that corporations can and will adopt
board reforms despite the fragility of the evidence concerning the
benefits of that reform. As a result, the corporate willingness to
embrace director independence despite mixed empirical evidence
undermines the presumption that the mixed empirical evidence

112. See supra notes 30, 35 and accompanying text.
113. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 231 (2002); Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1500 (2007)
(“Evidence that connects the increased presence of independent directors to shareholder
benefit is weak at best.”); Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley As
Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843,
1864 (2007) (describing the evidence as “decidedly mixed”); Usha Rodrigues, The
Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 455–58 (2008).
114. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 113, at 239 (illustrating that, prior to the
enactment of federal reforms, the vast majority of public companies had boards with a
supermajority of independent directors). To be sure, various federal rules currently
require not only that the majority of a public board be independent, but also that certain
committees be comprised completely of independent directors. See Fairfax, supra note 7,
at 805–06 (describing rules). However, the movement toward a board with a majority of
independent directors predated these rules. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 113, at 232–33
(noting the push for independent directors in 2000).
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related to board diversity is the sole or even motivating reason for the
stagnation in this area.115
D. Overstating the Business Case
The inability of these other rationales to fully explain the
stagnation in board diversity ultimately suggests that the reasons for
the stagnation rest with the business case itself. In fact, diversity
advocates may have overstated the importance of the business case
while failing to appreciate the continued relevance of moral and
social rationales for supporting board diversity. The next section
explores why shortcomings associated with the business case may be
the most compelling explanation for the relative stagnation in board
diversity.
1. The Business Case Unveiled
One reason why the business case has proved ineffective may be
that there is no “pure” business case for board diversity. Instead, the
business case is inextricably linked with the moral or social case for
board diversity because moral and social rationales are embedded in
the so-called business case. Thus, in describing the business case for
board diversity, one researcher incorporates noneconomic rationales
such as the signaling function of diversity as well as the extent to
which diversity provides legitimacy with internal and external
constituencies.116 Similarly, in buttressing its business case for board
diversity, Catalyst identified a number of factors that have moral or
social underpinnings.117 Specifically, Catalyst noted that board
diversity signals a commitment to inclusion that is essential to hiring
and retention, as well as a powerful antidote to stereotypes, and
enables women to serve as role models in ways that may enhance the
pipeline of available diversity candidates.118 While each of these
rationales is connected to the corporation’s bottom line because it
impacts the corporation’s ability to hire and retain qualified
employees, such rationales also implicate social and moral
justifications. The fact that market-based and social/moral-based
115. Of course it should be acknowledged that issues dealing with race and gender are
some of the most sensitive. Hence, it could be that corporations and boards are less willing
to take action in the face of mixed data when the reform involves such issues, as compared
to reforms related to other issues.
116. See Carter et al., supra note 22, at 398.
117. See LOIS JOY, ADVANCING WOMEN LEADERS: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN
WOMEN BOARD DIRECTORS AND WOMEN CORPORATE OFFICERS 8–9 (2008), available
at http://www.catalyst.org/file/229/wco_wbd_web.pdf.
118. See id.
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rationales are intertwined within the business case may explain the
difficulties with empirical proof in this area. More importantly, it
highlights the importance of not discarding social and moral
rationales, and shows that seeking to advance diversity by reference
only to economic rationales may prove ineffective.
2. The Pool Problem Revisited
In the context of corporate boards, the pool problem refers to
the notion that the pool of candidates that satisfy the criteria for
serving on corporate boards, particularly large public corporate
boards, is relatively small.119 Board studies reveal that corporations
favor directors who have executive-level experience.120 Hence, in
2007, ninety-six percent of Fortune 1000 boards had one or more
directors who was a retired executive, and such status reflected the
most common characteristic of the directors.121 Indeed, most directors
are active or retired CEOs or other corporate executives who have
headed a division or been a functional unit leader.122 The number of
people of color and women who fit this profile is relatively small.123
As a result, corporations that focus on these kinds of criteria may
experience a pool problem with respect to finding diverse director
candidates.
To be sure, corporations may have exaggerated the extent to
which the pool problem represents a significant hurdle to board

119. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 815; cf. Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and
Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
537, 547 (1988) (discussing the pool problem in legal academia); Daniel A. Farber, The
Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 893, 918–24 (1994) (noting
the pool problem in the context of education and employment); Randall L. Kennedy,
Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1813–14 (1989) (discussing
the pool problem in legal academia); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There
So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms?: An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L.
REV. 493, 503–06 (1996) (addressing the pool problem in corporate law firms).
120. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 12–13.
121. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 62, at 18.
122. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 13.
123. Fairfax, supra note 7, at 816–17. The pool problem is not unique to the world of
corporate directors. See, e.g., Chused, supra note 119, at 547 (demonstrating a pool
problem in legal academia); Farber, supra note 119, at 918–24 (asserting that the
educational gap, beginning at an early age, restricts the pool of qualified minority
personnel); Kennedy, supra note 119, at 1813–14 (stating that nonprejudicial factors play a
role in the limited pool of minority legal scholars); Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 119, at
503–06 (addressing a theory that blacks are underrepresented in corporate law, though
noting the difficulty of establishing the limits of the pool).
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diversity.124 This is because there are relatively few legal requirements
for board service, and none of those requirements demands that
board members have specific forms of experience or backgrounds.125
Moreover, while it is undeniable that board service requires some
understanding of financial matters and corporate affairs, there are no
studies indicating that enhanced board or corporate performance is
linked to ensuring that a majority or a supermajority of board
members have executive-level expertise. Instead, boards or
committees comprised of directors with previous managerial
experience may have biases in favor of management that could
undermine their ability to be independent and objective.126 In this
regard, the focus on overpopulating the board with prior executives
may have negative consequences. More importantly, the fact that
corporations gravitate toward board members with particular
backgrounds and experience is a function of custom rather than any
legal rules.127 From this perspective, because the pool problem stems
from custom rather than legal regimes, one may question the
legitimacy of the problem.
Nevertheless, the pool problem remains a significant obstacle.
Indeed, as a practical matter, boards continue to prefer particular
types of experiences that too often are not typical of people of
color.128
Importantly, however, diversity advocates likely hoped that the
business case would motivate corporations to take steps aimed at
124. Fairfax, supra note 7, at 817; cf. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 119, at 503–06
(describing the problem of actually defining the relevant pool for corporate law firms in
hiring associates).
125. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.02 (2002) (allowing corporations to
designate board requirements in the articles of incorporation or bylaws). In recent years,
various SEC and federal listing rules have limited the discretion of public corporations in
this area by imposing requirements related to financial expertise and independence. See
Fairfax, supra note 7, at 805–08, 816 (describing independence requirements). However,
none of these rules demand that directors have previous executive-level experience in
order to serve on a board.
126. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 33–34 (2004)
(noting that directors who are executives or former executives may have biases in favor of
management).
127. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 12–13 (explaining that corporations show
preference for directors with executive experience).
128. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 807–10. It is also important to note that even if boards
were willing to seek diverse candidates outside of this narrow pool, it is not clear that such
actions would prove beneficial to those candidates. Instead, it could be that those
candidates would feel excluded or be given less credence if their backgrounds or
experience levels were perceived as less favorable than those of their white counterparts.
Thus, whether the pool problem results from legal or extra-legal forces, it continues to
serve as a practical road block to board diversity.
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addressing the pool problem. Indeed, the pool problem is
longstanding. Diversity advocates likely believed that convincing
corporations of board diversity’s importance to their financial bottom
line would convince them to engage in more aggressive recruiting
efforts that extended beyond their traditional pool of candidates and
to take steps to expand the pipeline of available diverse candidates.
To be sure, some corporations and organizations have taken steps to
enhance the pipeline in this area,129 and the results of those steps
might not materialize for some time. However, it is not clear whether
and to what extent corporations have actively sought to extend their
search for diverse candidates. Instead, director recommendations
appear to continue to come from “the usual sources,” and hence,
corporations have not been expansive in their search for diverse
candidates.130
The fact that greater embrace of the business case may not have
translated into more aggressive efforts to ameliorate the pool
problem suggests that the business case has not had its desired effect.
Moreover, it raises concerns about whether appeals to economic
impulses can prompt directors to engage in broader efforts in this
area. Indeed, in many ways, overcoming the pool problem requires a
leap of faith because it requires corporations to expend resources in
developing a stronger pipeline without proof that this development
will have immediate results. It is likely that moral or social appeals
may prove more effective than those that speak solely in terms of
economics because they do not require concrete data; instead, they
focus on “doing the right thing.”131 Then too, overcoming the pool
problem may require directors to make personal commitments that
may move them beyond their comfort zones.132 Characterizing
diversity in market terms may have suggested that such directors need
129. For example, DirectWomen markets itself as “the only program specifically
designed to identify, develop, and support a select group of accomplished women
attorneys to provide qualified directors needed by the boards of U.S. companies, while
promoting the independence and diversity required for good corporate governance.”
About DirectWomen: Overview, DIRECTWOMEN, http://directwomen.org/about (last
visited Feb. 22, 2011). Corporate sponsors of DirectWomen include Kraft Foods and
Walmart. DirectWomen Board Institute: 2009 Sponsors, DIRECTWOMEN, http://direct
women.org/sponsorship/2009-sponsors/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
130. See, e.g., SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 16.
131. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 1277; Knapp & Grover, supra note 5, at 303; Taylor’s
Perspective, supra note 5, at 4.
132. See Stacy Blake-Bear et al., Unfinished Business: The Impact of Race on
Understanding Mentoring Relationships 12 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Organizational Behavior
Faculty Unit, Working Paper No. 06-060, 2006), available at http://www.hbs.edu/
research/pdf/06-060.pdf.
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not move beyond—and may have encouraged directors to remain
in—their comfort zones. By contrast, a moral or social appeal may
have better luck in ensuring that directors make a personal
commitment in this area. Thus, relying on market or economic terms
may have served to depersonalize the board diversity issue in ways
that proved unproductive.
3. Ingrained Biases
There has been a recent surge of interest in literature indicating
that even people who perceive themselves as tolerant have
“unconscious” or “ingrained” biases that influence their behavior
when they interact with people of different races or genders.133
Importantly, the literature suggests that unconscious biases cause
people to misunderstand how they would behave in the context of
issues dealing with race or gender.134
To be sure, some question the link between ingrained bias and
discriminatory behavior. For example, some insist that studies
regarding ingrained bias simply reflect the influence of prejudice, and
reach the overbroad conclusion that “we are all racists at heart.”135
Others note that “researchers should exercise caution before
suggesting that a given individual or group of individuals holds
unconscious racist attitudes.”136 However, research does indicate that
people can engage in unconscious, racially biased behavior.137
In the corporate setting, these ingrained biases, as opposed to
overt discrimination and racism, may serve as one of the most
133. See, e.g., Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE
NATURE OF REMEMBERING 117, 136–37 (Henry L. Roediger, III et al. eds., 2001); John
Dovido & Samuel Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2004); Kerry Kawakami et al., Mispredicting Affective and Behavioral
Responses to Racism, 323 SCIENCE 276, 276 (2009); Howard Ross, Proven Strategies for
Addressing Unconscious Bias in the Workplace, CDO INSIGHTS, Aug. 2008, at 1, 2,
available at http://www.cookross.com/docs/UnconsciousBias.pdf; Eben Harrell, Study:
Racist Attitudes Are Still Ingrained, TIME (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/
health/article/0,8599,1870408,00.html. In a study that tracked 4,100 MBA students who
graduated between 1996 and 2007, researchers found that women continue to lag behind
men at every career stage. See Nancy M. Carter & Christine Silva, Women in Management:
Delusions of Progress, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2010, at 19, 19–20. Researchers attributed
at least part of that lag to the fact that “businesses may be inadvertently overlooking bias
that creeps in at initial job placement.” Id. at 21.
134. See Kawakami et al., supra note 133, at 276–78; Harrell, supra note 133.
135. Amy Wax & Philip Tetlock, We’re All Racists at Heart, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2005,
at A16.
136. Hart Blanton & James Jaccard, Unconscious Racism: A Concept in Pursuit of a
Measure, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 277, 284 (2008).
137. Id. at 293.
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challenging impediments for women and people of color.138 From this
perspective, such biases also may influence the board selection and
retention process. Moreover, such biases may be a more important
factor in determining whether board diversity increases.
On the one hand, it seems more likely that moral or social
appeals will prove more effective in combating ingrained biases than
economic ones. On the other hand, it could be that painting these
rationales in market terms has enabled corporations to ignore
confronting the more difficult issues associated with ingrained biases.
Ultimately, the fact that moral or social appeals may better respond
to these hurdles associated with board diversity reflects the notion
that the business case is insufficient on its own to fully advance board
diversity. Underscoring this point, after analyzing the available and
conflicting data related to the business case for board diversity, one
recent study concludes that the case for board diversity should not
rest solely on the impact of such diversity on a firm’s financial
performance.139
CONCLUSION
In recent years, diversity advocates have relied on business
rationales to support their efforts to increase board diversity. This
reliance stemmed from perceived defects in the effectiveness of social
and moral rationales historically used to justify diversity efforts.140 It
also stemmed from the supposition that the business case would
better motivate corporate behavior than moral or social appeals.
However, the empirical evidence suggests that the increased
reliance on the business case has not translated into any appreciable
gains in board diversity. Instead, there has been a relative stagnation
in board diversity efforts even as more corporations and regulators
appear willing to rhetorically embrace the business case.
This stagnation, therefore, calls into question the strategy of
supplanting moral and social rationales in favor of the business case.
Moreover, the stagnation suggests that while the business rationale
may have a role to play in advancing diversity efforts, the moral and
social rationales also may be critical to that advancement. Thus,
diversity advocates should not allow the business case to crowd out or
otherwise completely displace moral appeals. The increased attention
to the business case may have prevented diversity advocates from
138. See Ross, supra note 133, at 2, 6–8.
139. See Carter et al., supra note 22, at 412.
140. See Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1554–55.
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focusing on ways to articulate and perhaps legitimize noneconomic
rationales for board diversity. The stagnation suggests that such a
focus is necessary to the board diversity effort. Indeed, the stagnation
suggests that diversity advocates must create a strategy that
effectively incorporates and validates moral and social justifications.
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